



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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Oil and the Middle East

by Henry F. Grady

Current tensions in the Middle East are centered in Iran, but in varying degrees of intensity they extend throughout the whole region and the entire Muslim world. These tensions arise from numerous causes but focus on the oil of the Persian Gulf area—at the moment the oil of Iran. It would be a mistake to assume that the struggle between the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Iranian government is limited to a business conflict. Basically the controversy represents a revolt on the part of the Iranians against what they regard as the economic domination of their country by the British through the oil company.

The struggle grows out of a nationalistic movement which seeks to throw off what it views as outside control of Iran's affairs. The revolt is somewhat blind and deeply passionate. It is accompanied by real threats of disaster to Iran and possibly the whole Western world. If not settled soon, the controversy can create conditions in Iran under which a Communist coup could take place and Iran might be drawn behind the Iron Curtain. Such a development might even lead to World War III.

The British have so far been very much inclined to regard the oil problem in Iran as entirely their affair. But if we are going to be in on the crash landing, we should be in on the take-off. It is unthinkable that anyone should regard the stability and security of a critical area on the border of Russia anything but the proper concern of those countries, particularly Britain and the United States, which are struggling to contain Russia. The oil question, which affects the stability and security of Iran, is definitely our concern and should, in my opinion, have been very much more a matter of our concern during the past year and a half.

The matter has become desperately serious because it has been so badly handled. And our responsibility for this bad handling cannot be discounted. The British government owns 53 per cent of the stock of the Anglo-Iranian Company. The Anglo-Iranian's earnings have represented almost \$300 million in the British balance of payments; the British navy and air force obtain their fuel mainly from this source; and Britain, as well as our other allies in Western Europe, depend heavily for their oil products on the Anglo-

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Iranian. This would be particularly the case in time of war. Despite this situation we were regularly told by Anglo-Iranian officials in Teheran that the affairs of the oil company were of no concern to British, much less American, foreign policy. The British Foreign Office appeared to accept that view. Despite our earnest urgings, it did nothing to correct the stubborn, uncompromising attitude of the oil company until nationalization had taken place. Now it has become active when it may be too late. Our government failed by not insisting over a year ago that the problem did vitally concern the United States and that the colonial approach of the Anglo-Iranian Company, which had the tacit approval of the British Foreign Office, was obsolete and certain to be ineffectual. Our relations with so close an ally as Britain are such that plain and emphatic talk is in order.

Pressure by Britain

The present difficulties in Iran and their repercussions throughout the Middle East—an area which contains about 50 per cent of the world's proven petroleum resources—could easily have been avoided. In July 1949 the Anglo-Iranian signed a supplementary agreement to its 1933 oil agreement doubling the royalties. This new document, however, required ratification by the Majlis (parliament). When General Ali Razmara became prime minister a year later in June 1950, it had not yet been ratified. Razmara could not make an effective fight for it without some political justification. He

therefore sought to obtain from the company a number of nonmonetary concessions. These could have been granted by the Anglo-Iranian without difficulty, but the colonial formula is never to "weaken" by conceding anything that is not in the agreement. The motto is: Be tough! Let them take it or leave it. "When they need the royalties bad enough they will ratify," said the company's officials. In other words, pressure was applied to the Iranian government. This method completely failed then and throughout the struggle.

There was no talk of nationalization when I arrived in Teheran a few days after Razmara became prime minister, but Razmara's inability to obtain the modest concessions with which he felt sure he could secure ratification of the oil royalties agreement prolonged the controversy. At that point the National Front under Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh began the campaign for nationalization, which resulted first in the assassination of Razmara, who opposed nationalization, by a member of the fanatical Fadayan-i-Islam (Protectors of Islam), and then in the passage of nationalization legislation and Mossadegh's rise to the position of prime minister.

Then the British made a liberal offer which I believe the Iranians should have accepted. By that time, however, the feeling of antagonism against the British had become so intense that the Iranians brusquely rejected the original offer as well as a later modification. The Iranians now seem determined not to have a British company operate the industry

under any conditions. For them the oil question has become a symbol of revolt against foreign interference in their economic life. The struggle over oil is seen in Teheran as a struggle for "liberation" and must be appraised in that light.

Perhaps the Iranians and the British will agree to have an international management group run the oil industry which would get production going again and oil flowing out to its established markets. But this now seems doubtful. Meanwhile, the Iranian government is becoming desperate for funds. In the past, 43 per cent of its budget has come from oil royalties, and no royalties have been received since March. How will the army, the civil servants and the 70,000 unemployed workers in the industry be paid? The oil company has continued to pay the wages of these workers until now, although the refinery has been closed since last July. It is expected that they will stop paying if it becomes clear that a settlement cannot be reached. Payment of these wages will then become the responsibility of the Iranian government. Premier Mossadegh hopes to win public support in the national elections of December 4 and to obtain a loan from the United States to tide Iran over.

The crisis approaches. Time is running out fast. Will reasonableness and conciliation at the last minute save Iran and possibly the world from disaster? One must fervently hope they will.

(Mr. Grady, former United States ambassador to India, Greece and Iran, has recently returned from Teheran.)

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Stronger Morale NATO's Need

The United States and its Western allies may soon find it necessary to re-examine their plans for improving relations with the Soviet Union. Statements made at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Rome on November 24 disclosed the determination of the Western allies to proceed toward their present goal. This goal is the achievement of a degree of military strength sufficient to balance the strength of the Soviet coalition and, in the spirit of confidence such strength would create, to negotiate with Moscow for an end of the conflict that wracks the world.

Arms and Economy

Both General Dwight D. Eisenhower, supreme commander of the European army, and W. Averell Harriman, chairman of the Temporary Council Committee which is examining the potential resources of the Western powers, declared that the North Atlantic coalition has four times the resources available to the Soviet bloc and that the objectives of NATO are entirely realizable provided these potential capabilities are properly employed. Yet the Western European nations continue to doubt whether their economies can create the military strength required for attainment of the military-diplomatic goals set by the West.

These doubts focus the attention of the Truman Administration on two related questions. The first is whether the West should continue to seek a basis of agreement with the Soviet Union. The second is whether the United States should help its allies to achieve strength in some form besides military force.

The tendency of the Administra-

tion is to answer "Yes" to the first question. The establishment of good relations—at least a relationship of mutual tolerance between Washington and Moscow—remains President Truman's aim. Washington's foreign-policy makers are, in the main, optimistic enough to wonder whether the Soviet Union may not explore the possibilities of a diplomatic settlement with the West before the latter has augmented its present military power. The rising hope for peace in Korea nurtures this belief. The desire of the new British government, particularly of Prime Minister Winston Churchill and of Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, to soften the West's diplomatic intercourse with Moscow bolsters it.

The recent visit to Washington of General Dwight D. Eisenhower underlined another aspect of this confident belief. Whereas General Eisenhower formerly sought an army of 60 divisions by 1954, he is now thinking of 30 divisions by 1952. Such a force would scarcely balance the land power of the West with that of the East. The Soviet Union still has 175 divisions at its disposal, not counting the troops of satellite countries. The problem of balance, however, not only involves the armed force actually in the field but the size of the potential force and the speed with which it can be organized and armed. And in terms of potential power the United States remains strong.

Nevertheless, the present condition of American-Russian relations does not warrant optimism for anything better than a dull continuation of the familiar grim disagreement. Nothing has occurred to relax the

apprehension with which each group of nations views the other. The psychological impediments to harmony are even more formidable than the concrete differences that arise from day to day.

Optimism Premature

If the Soviet Union has been tempted by Western weakness to be intransigently uncooperative in the past, it is not likely to change when it notes evidences of the West's failure to become militarily strong this year. Among such evidences are the economic crises in Britain and France, which delay action on the rearmament policy; the lagging development of General Eisenhower's European army, now consisting only of 20 divisions, many of which are weak; and the failure of the United States, Britain and France to arrange with West Germany thus far for a contribution of German troops and material to the European army within the foreseeable future. If the Soviet Union, on the other hand, has been intransigent from fear that the West wishes it ill, it will hardly welcome a suggestion of harmony at a time when the West is not strong enough to impose its policy on Moscow.

In view of the possibility that the Kremlin may not respond warmly to diplomatic overtures, the Truman Administration needs to concentrate on the task of strengthening the West in economic and social ways that would safeguard it from Soviet domination and at the same time emphasize the peaceful intentions of the West toward the U.S.S.R.

BLAIR BOLLES



Should U.S. Send Ambassador to Vatican?

by George A. Lindbeck

Mr. Lindbeck, an instructor in philosophy and historical theology at Yale University, spent most of the years 1949-51 in Europe and has written on American Roman Catholicism in French publications.

It is both proper and reasonable that the United States have diplomatic representation at Vatican City. This, and not the rank of our representative nor the way in which he has been nominated, is the topic to be discussed. Diplomatic recognition as such is the central issue, for those who oppose it claim that in any form it would constitute a violation of the principle of separation of church and state.

The storm that has been created by President Truman's appointment is deplorable. The apparent belief on the part of some Protestants that the mere appointment of a representative to the Vatican threatens a fundamental principle of American democracy reflects a disturbing lack of a sense of proportion. It illustrates the narrowness and defensiveness of the only issues on which Protestants apparently can unite with vigor. And it has the alarming consequence of leading us into a religious controversy unrelated to the central problem at stake.

Diplomatic recognition of Vatican City is not a violation of the separation of church and state. This is clear first of all on the level of constitutional law. The First Amendment forbids Congress to make any "law respecting an establishment of religion." The appointment of a representative with the consent of the Senate, however, is not law-making. It is an executive act pure and simple. Consequently, it is highly doubtful that there is any way of even bringing this issue into court. In a legal sense, the question of constitutionality does not arise.

But it is further argued that diplomatic recognition gives preferential status to the Roman Catholic Church and thus infringes the separation of church and state interpreted as requiring the equal treatment of all religious bodies.

No Special Privileges

In what, however, does this supposed preferential status consist? The legal and administrative relations of the Roman Catholic Church in the United States to the American government are unaltered by diplomatic recognition of Vatican City; and yet surely it is only concrete advantages of this kind which can be properly described as "special privileges."

It is true that the effects of this action may be in some ways beneficial to American Roman Catholicism, although this is by no means certain. Many Catholics, for instance, will think their church's prestige has been thereby enhanced; while some Protestants, forgetting that they glory in repudiating the sort of alliance between secular and religious power represented by the Vatican, may think their prestige has been lessened. Such intangible differences in the effects of a government action, however, do not constitute a preferential status.

It must be emphasized that the fact that a government policy affects various religious bodies differently does not in itself represent unequal treatment nor favoritism. Such differences are the inescapable result of variations in the beliefs and organization, or lack of organization, of the different churches and secular

groups. Think, for example, of the way in which the government through its chaplaincies subsidizes the propagation of some religious viewpoints but not of others; of how varied is the application of property laws to different sorts of ecclesiastical structure; and of the treatment of pacifists in wartime.

Lastly, and least plausibly, it has been suggested that the President's action violates the separation of church and state by involving approval of the principle of an ecclesiastical state. But diplomatic recognition implies neither approval nor disapproval of either the character or policies of the power recognized. It is an executive convenience, not a political value judgment, and much less a religious one.

The President, then, in extending diplomatic recognition to Vatican City is doing nothing contrary to the principles of American democracy. And so the debate over this act should be deflated to a temperate discussion of its effect on the national interest.

Effect on National Interest

In brief, the national interest is harmed at home but advanced abroad. This is all that can be said at present with reasonable assurance. It is futile to try to balance the benefit to foreign policy against the injury to domestic unity.

Foremost among the advantages to our foreign policy is the effect on European Catholics, especially those of neutralist tendencies. These Catholics fear the supposed hot-headed

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by Henry P. Van Dusen

Dr. Van Dusen, president of Union Theological Seminary, is chairman of the Study Committee of the World Council of Churches and member of the editorial boards of *Christianity and Crisis*, *The Ecumenical Review* and other publications.

WHY is the proposed American embassy to the Vatican opposed by the Protestant clergy of the country virtually to a man, by a large proportion of Protestant and Jewish laity, not a few Catholic laymen and numerous citizens of no religious affiliation?

Many Americans are frankly baffled about the appointment of an American Ambassador to the Vatican. They desire and deserve clear and convincing answers to two questions: (1) Would a Vatican embassy strengthen our fight against communism? (2) Would a Vatican embassy really constitute a departure from basic American principles, and how serious would such a departure be?

First, it is generally assumed that the Vatican is "the best-informed 'listening-post' in Europe" and that "the Church of Rome is a potential ally of great value in our struggle with Russia and its satellites." What are the facts?

Is Vatican Listening-Post?

The magazine *Time* has pointed out that "the efficiency of the Vatican's 'world-wide information service' has probably been exaggerated for many years" and that on at least three recent occasions of the highest consequence to the Vatican itself—the agreement between the Polish government and the Roman Catholic bishops, the banishment of Archbishop Josef Beran from Prague, the trial and sentence of Archbishop Joseph Grosz in Hungary—the Vatican received its first information from secular sources. It should be

more widely known that officers of the State Department charged with appraising the value to our government of the Myron Taylor mission have stated, "No information of substantial value was derived which could not have been obtained in other ways"; and that the highest officials of the State Department are indifferent, when not opposed, to the Vatican embassy, although they are not at liberty to reveal publicly their dissent from the President.

The Vatican's opposition to communism is supposed to guarantee that the Catholic Church will prove a ready and useful ally in the East-West conflict. Actually, the Vatican has studiously declined to take any position with respect to that conflict. Its pronouncements and actions have been directed against communism as an atheistic philosophy. The Vatican similarly opposes naturalism, modernism, humanism, secularism or any other philosophy which challenges Catholic faith—philosophies dominant in countries with whose governments the Vatican has worked out satisfactory rapprochements. It has said nothing of Russia and its satellites as the concrete embodiments of atheistic communism. Moreover, the present Pope's concordats with Hitler and Mussolini, the Vatican's support of the Franco regime in Spain, not to speak of the Roman Church's traditional readiness to come to terms with any government which will permit minimum freedoms for its worship, raise doubts as to the trustworthiness of the Vatican as an ally of democracy.

In any event, as the spokesmen of

united Protestantism have recently stated:

"Formal diplomatic relations constitute no binding agreement for either party to reveal any information except what it chooses to reveal. On the other hand, if both parties desire that all sources of information be utilized and coordinated against communism, this can be achieved through our ambassador to the government of Italy, who is resident in Rome and readily accessible to the Vatican. Eager allies in a common cause are not frustrated in their common efforts by considerations of protocol or prestige."

The conclusion is inescapable. Either the Vatican has no collaboration of value to offer, or its avowed desire for allies in its crusade against communism is subordinate to its determination to obtain diplomatic recognition by the United States. This leads to the second question.

Church and State Separation

Would a Vatican embassy constitute a departure from basic American principles, and how serious would such a departure be?

The so-called "American principle of separation of church and state" does not signify indifference or neutrality toward religion. The specific evil which the founders of our Republic sought to exclude from this country was the interlocking of church and government. They were especially opposed to any church which took to itself the prerogatives of a state. And their opposition was buttressed by their knowledge of the tragic mischief done in Europe for centuries through the efforts of the Papacy to direct and dominate governments. The Roman Church has not altered its policy in this regard.

The conviction of the American

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belligerency of the United States and would be greatly reassured by official American liaison with what they regard as the moderating and peace-loving power of the Vatican. Our recognition of Vatican City would aid in winning the support of European Catholics by helping to convince them that peace, not war, is our aim.

Secondly, it is important for us to communicate with the Vatican on the diplomatic level. Vatican attitudes do have influence on various matters which concern us deeply, such as the policies of Catholic political parties throughout Europe. It is therefore desirable for this country to use the most effective means for bringing American views to the attention of the Vatican. The regular way of doing this is through diplomatic channels. In an institution as concerned with protocol as the Vatican is known to be, it is also the best way.

These advantages do not seem to be countered by significant disadvantages. On this side of the Iron Curtain, only Americans apparently find diplomatic recognition of Vatican City objectionable. For instance

in France, which in some respects carries separation of church and state farther than we do, even strong anti-clericals are not shocked or antagonized by the presence of a French ambassador at the Holy See. Thus President Truman's decision is both proper and reasonable if it is viewed as it should be—as a routine exercise of his executive powers. The fact that it is not always so viewed makes its political wisdom questionable; but, in any case, the injection of the issue of separation of church and state into the discussion must be considered unnecessary and regrettable.

Van Dusen

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nation with respect to the right relations of church and government, as set forth by the Founding Fathers, as embodied in the First Amendment to the Constitution, as actually practiced in this country throughout its history and as applied with increasing rigor by our highest courts in recent years, is: unfettered freedom for every church, special privilege for no church, and above all, no official recognition of any particular church. The view of the Roman Catholic Church with respect to the right relations of church

and government, as set forth by Pope Leo XIII, is: "It is not lawful for the state to hold in equal favor different kinds of religion." This is interpreted in the authoritative work on *Catholic Principles of Politics* by Ryan and Boland to mean, "Since the profession of one religion is necessary in the state, that religion must be professed which alone is true."

What is at stake in the present issue, therefore, is much more than the President's constitutional right to create embassies and name envoys, or the wisdom of a political expedient in the face of immediate international problems, or formal adherence to an American principle set down nearly two centuries ago. The official recognition of the Roman Catholic Church (or any other church) as a political power, a government entitled to diplomatic recognition, would constitute an acceptance of the Catholic theory of church-state relations in place of the American principle of church-state relations. It would mark a departure from the firmly established policy and practice of the American nation with respect to religion from its founding to the present day, a departure fraught with ominous consequences for the long future.



FOREIGN POLICY SPOTLIGHT

Disarmament: Cart or Horse?

Following the heated initial presentation of disarmament plans in the United Nations General Assembly by Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Y. Vishinsky, the Political and Security Committee settled down to work in an atmosphere somewhat tempered by the mild remarks of British Foreign Secretary Anthony

Eden. The new British spokesman in the UN urged his colleagues not to look at things in terms of unrelieved black and white and voiced the hope that some progress might be gradually achieved through piecemeal practical negotiations between East and West about "definite and limited problems."

When Mr. Acheson on November

19 elaborated in a cooler tone the plan he had presented on November 6, he indicated several points on which the West had sought to meet objections formerly raised by Moscow against the Baruch plan for atomic-energy control. Hitherto the United States had drawn a sharp distinction between "conventional," that is nonatomic, weapons and the

atomic bomb and had been more eager to discuss international control of the latter than of the former. Now Washington proposes dissolution of the two UN commissions on atomic energy and conventional armaments and the creation by the Security Council of a 12-member Disarmament Commission consisting of Council members and Canada. Mr. Acheson also suggests the calling of a conference of all states with large military establishments to consider draft treaties for armaments limitation. This, it is assumed, would permit the inclusion of Communist China in an arms-limitation conference, even though Mr. Acheson has made clear at Paris that the United States remains adamant in opposing the admission of the Peiping regime to the United Nations.

In his reply of November 24 Mr. Vishinsky, refraining from vituperation, offered 12 "serious amendments" to the Western plan which would in effect fundamentally alter its character. He renewed Moscow's demand for "immediate" prohibition of atomic weapons under international control but without provision for international inspection, which is the core of the Western program as it was of the Baruch plan. And he called again for a one-third across-the-board reduction of armed forces by the Big Five, including Communist China.

The American delegation discovered only three points in common between the Western and Russian plans. The Soviet government, it is believed, would accept the merger of the atomic energy and conventional weapons commissions into an agency it would call the Combined Commission. It agrees with the Western contention that not only regular forces, but also paramilitary and security and police forces,

should be subject to disarmament control. And both sides are in accord that after preliminary work the disarmament proposals should be submitted to a general conference which would be attended by both members and nonmembers of the United Nations.

Big Four Talks?

The smaller UN members, as well as large but weak nations like India, believe that it will prove impossible to arrive at a workable reconciliation of Western and Russian views on disarmament in the full publicity glare of UN meetings. Therefore, in a resolution submitted on November 26 by Iraq, Syria and Pakistan, the Arab-Asian group proposed that representatives of the Big Four con-

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fer secretly with Luis Padilla Nervo of Mexico, president of the UN General Assembly, to see whether they could agree on a common formula for disarmament and the abolition of atomic weapons. The United States promptly said that it would accept this resolution if a majority of the Political Committee favored it.

Among the smaller nations doubt has been expressed whether disarmament can come ahead of easing of tension through agreement on political issues or must wait for the high-level negotiations adumbrated by Winston Churchill. That the Truman Administration may also assign a larger role to diplomacy in the cold war than it has done in the past seems indicated by the report that George F. Kennan, veteran Foreign

Service officer with long experience in Russian affairs, now on leave from the State Department, may be sent to Moscow as ambassador next spring.

Mr. Kennan is nationally known as the author of the "containment policy," which he set forth under the pseudonym of "Mr. X" in the July 1947 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. At that time Mr. Kennan believed that containment would ultimately bring about the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power. Neither development has yet come to pass. In his recently published little book, *American Diplomacy: 1900-1950*, a searching analysis of the bases of United States foreign policy, Mr. Kennan appears to have moved beyond the conclusions he expressed four years ago. He deprecates the legalistic approach to international affairs. He considers total war and total victory as neither feasible nor desirable. He does not propose "appeasement." But he suggests "the emergence of a new attitude among us toward many things outside our borders that are irritating and unpleasant today—an attitude more like that of the doctor toward those physical phenomena in the human body that are neither pleasant nor fortunate—an attitude of detachment and soberness and readiness to reserve judgment."

The policy of containing Russia, as interpreted by some of those who have implemented it, has often appeared to be a policy of unlimited commitments on the part of the United States. Mr. Kennan's rethinking of American diplomacy indicates a preference for commitments that the United States feels capable of fulfilling, and for the use of moral and ideological persuasion, not chiefly of military force dedicated to total victory.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

As Others See Us

During and since the Ottawa conference our North Atlantic allies have been debating two crucial questions: whether their still precarious economies could bear the burdens of increased rearmament without additional financial aid from the United States, and whether Washington would concentrate exclusively on the building of armaments or would simultaneously consider further negotiations with the Russians.

This debate is clearly reflected in the press of the Netherlands. *Het Parool*, independent Socialist organ, welcomed President Truman's Wake Forest speech of October 15 because, in its opinion, the President announced as his policy "the building of strength but with the avowed purpose of achieving, from this basis of strength, a modus vivendi in the literal sense of the word, for the alternative is death and destruction."

The Liberal organ *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant* declared: "If we co-operate in a rearmament effort which threatens to become the greatest of all history, we must know where we are going. . . . We want peace, but we are building a war machine, the like of which was previously only

developed after war had already started. This causes a chain reaction of ever increasing threats and fears. . . . Something of what the ancient Greeks called Fate lies in this development. We realize that we are entering into danger, but we cannot act differently because we are unable to find another means of averting this danger. Fortunately, this realization still inspires us to use caution and maybe it will help us pass the crucial period of the next few years."

In *Le Figaro* (Paris) of November 13 the pro-American commentator, Raymond Aron, wrote: "I believe that an easing of tension would at present tend to favor the West. . . .

As for the Americans, after not seeing until the Korean affair that in order to wage the cold war they had to have armaments as well as the atomic bomb and an economic potential, they are now in danger of going to the other extreme and forgetting that weapons, whether conventional or new, are not sufficient to solve all problems. A temporary *détente* would not lull the United States back into heedlessness, and it would help American opinion to weigh with greater calm the importance of the different battlefields and to consider the prospects of the more distant as well as the immediate future."



FPA Bookshelf

BOOKS ON U.S. POLICY

The Record of American Diplomacy, edited by Ruhl J. Bartlett. New York, Knopf, 1950. \$5.50.

The second, enlarged edition of this useful compilation of over 300 key documents and important sources carries the story of this country's foreign policy from the colonial era through the North Atlantic treaty and the Point Four program of 1950.

The United States in World Affairs, 1950, by Richard P. Stebbins and the Research Staff of the Council on Foreign Relations. New York; Harper, 1951. \$5.

The 1950 volume, like its predecessors, presents a comprehensive review of the year's international developments. Describ-

ing the open conflict in the Far East, the disorder in the Middle East and the continuing cold war in Europe, the survey includes a useful bibliography and chronology of world events.

Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy, 1950-1951, prepared by the staff of the International Studies Group of The Brookings Institution. Washington, Brookings, 1950. \$3.

Fourth in a series of annual volumes, this appraisal of the international scene gives an account of the fundamental and continuing objectives of Great Britain and the Soviet Union, as well as of the United States. Included is a detailed analysis of the security problem facing this country in Southeast Asia.

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In the next issue

A Foreign Policy Report

Indonesia: Tests of Independence

by Shannon McCune, former
ECA administrator in Indonesia

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